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Abstract
Special stock market segments for small company shares were established by all
major European stock exchanges during the 1980's. After showing a remarkable
success during the first years of their existence - both in the primary as well as in the
secondary market - these segments today suffer from increasing illiquidity. The stock
exchange authorities in London and in Amsterdam have therefore decided to close
down their stock markets for smaller companies. This paper takes a closer look at the
current situation ofthese stock market segments throughout Europe and discusses the
causes for their decline.
*) This paper is an updated English version of ZEW-Discussion Paper No. 94-05
entitled "Borsensegmente fUr Nebenwerte an Europas Borsen"1. Introduction
During the last few years the European financial markets have experienced an enor-
mous increase in stock exchange turnover. Not all companies listed on the stock
exchange, however, have profited equally. To the contrary, a growing percentage of
total trading volume is done in the internationally-known standard stocks. In the case
of the German stock market for example, the five most actively traded stocks
accounted for 47,2 % ofthe total trading volume in 1993 as compared to only 30,6 %
in 1989. On the other hand, second-line stocks suffer from growing illiquidity. In the
long term, this will lead to a two-tier stock market with significant effects on the cost
ofequity. I
The following paper covers special stock market segments for smaller companies
which have been established by all major European stock exchanges since the
beginning of the ]980's. These "junior stock markets", as they are also called, were
intended to promote equity finance by enabling more companies to go public.2 The
"Unlisted Securities Market" (USM) ofthe London Stock Exchange and the"Official
Parallel Market" (OPM) of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange as well as the "Mercato
Ristretto" in Italy and the "Second Marche" in France were among the first of these
new stock market segments. The German stock exchanges introduced the "Geregelter
Market" (Regulated Market) in May 1987.
The initial results were quite remarkable: Many new companies went public and
sought a listing of their shares in these market segments. Investor participation and
trading volume were quite satisfactory. In the late 1980's, however, this trend rever-
sed: Both the number of new issues as well as the trading volume fell dramatically.
As a consequence the Amsterdam Stock Exchange closed its OPM at the end of
1993. The London Stock Exchange also decided to abolish the USM by 1996.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the causes and motives that led
to the creation ofthe new stock market segments. In section 3, several ofthose junior
stock markets in Europe are discussed in detail. Section 4 analyzes the causes for
their decline: Both cyclical and fundamental factors will be looked at. Part of the
decline may be explained with flaws in the design and organization ofthese markets.
However, increasing illiquidity is not confmed to these market segments alone, but
affects second-line stocks in general. The growing internationalisation and institu-
tionalisation ofthe European capital markets have caused a concentration ofturnover
in favour of standard stocks. Due to limited data availability, this paper focuses on
the stock market segments for smaller companies rather than on individual stocks.
Section 5 concludes with an outlook.
I The relationship between stock market liquidity and asset pricing has been reviewed comprehensively in recent
finance liternture. see for insulJlce Cooper/Groth/Avern (1985). Amihud/Mendelson (1986), (1988) and (1991).
2 see Schmidt etaI. (1984), Schmidt (1984) or Duncan (1986).2. Causes and Motives for the Creation of Junior Stock Markets in Europe
By the end of the 1970's the European stock exchanges had lost their role as an im-
portant source of finance. All national stock markets were confronted with the same
problems: First, the number of listed companies had decreased continuously since the
1950's and 1960's. In France 1,566 companies were listed in 1962, twenty years
later in 1982 only 707 companies remained} In the United Kingdom, the figure fell
from 3,816 in 1955 to 2,052 at the end of 1979.4 The Dutch stock market experien-
ced a decline from 655 to a mere 275 companies between 1960 and 1975.5 In
Germany, 686 companies were listed in 1956, in 1982, there were only 452 left.6
Second, new companies were reluctant to seek a listing on the stock market. Thus,
the number of introductions also fell dramatically: In France the average number of
new issues declined from 60 annually in the early 1960's to merely five in 1980.7 In
Germany only nine compani~s were admitted to official trading between 1977 and
1982.8 In Austria there was not a single new issue between 1962 and 1982.
This caused a thorough discussion among economists and practitioners how to make
the stock markets more attractive for issuing companies. Special committees and
working groups were set up to examine the situation and its causes. Two reasons
were brought up to explain the phenomenon: First, general economic conditions after
the impact ofthe oil price shocks and depressed stock prices did not provide an ade-
quate setting for companies to go public. Second, a lack of stock market segmen-
tation was regarded as another important factor: At that time, most European stock
markets only provided an official market segment with extensive listing and dis-
closure requirements while unregulated off-exchange OTe-markets existed without
any admission requirement~, official supervision or investor protection codes.9
Onerous admission requirements as well as stringent disclosure and advertising
requirements in the official stock market put an enormous financial and organiza-
tional strain on small and medium-size companies. The prerequisite to float a mini-
mum of 25 % of the share capital made owners reluctant to seek a listing in the
official markets.lO On the other hand, the OTe-markets did not provide an adequate
market for innovative companies either: They were more or less occasional or
spontaneous markets whenever transactions occurred.l1 At the end of the 1970's,
there was an urgent need for new stock market segments with lower admission
3 see Grenier (1988), p. 51.
4 see Buckland/Davis (1989), p. 7.
5 see Amsterdam Stock Exch.wge (1991), p. 19.
6 see Claussen (1984), p. 3.
7 see Jaffeux (1992), p. 18.
8 see Schiinnann/Korfgen (1987), p. 188.
9 see Buckland/Davis (1989), p. 7-9.
10 see Duncan (1986), p. 2 and Jaffeux (1992), p. 173.
11 see Flornoy (1983), p. 265 and Duncan (1986), p. 15.
2requirements, that allowed smaller companies with high growth potential to go public
while maintaining regular and orderly trading. 12
The new junior markets took an intermediate position between the existing official
markets and OTC-markets. Admission and disclosure requirements were lowered as
compared to the official market. In most cases, only a minimum of 10 % of equity
capital had to be offered to the public as opposed to 25 % in the main market. The
new segments were designed as transition markets to prepare finns for a full listing.
As successful companies grew bigger, they were expected to transfer to the main
market. At the same time, a clear distinction against the existing OTC-markets was to
signal a minimum of financial standing of the companies listed in these segments. It
was hoped to attract private as well as institutional investors, who are often obliged
to invest in listed companies only.13
With the new markets segments a three-tier hierarchy evolved in most European
stock markets:
I) an official segment for blue chips and major second-line stocks,
2) a semi-official segment with lower admission requirements for smaller companies,
3) and in most countries an entirely unregulated OTC-market for unlisted companies
(table I).
12 see Jaffeux (1992), p. ITt
13 see Duncan (1986), p. 2.
3Table I: Stock market segments of the European stock exchanges
Country Main list 'Second list OTC-Market
(year ofintroduction)
Austria Amtlicher Handel Geregelter Freiverkehr Sonstiger Wertpapierhandel
(1948) (1989)
Belgium Marche de la Cote Second Marche or Tweede Ventes Publiques
- MarcheaTerme Markt
- Marche au Comptant (1985)
Denmark Bors I Bors II und III OTC-market
(1982)
Finland Official List OTC-Markt Brokers' List
(1985)
France Cote Officielle Second Marche Marche Hors-Cote
- Reglement Mensuel (1983) (1962)
- Marche au Comptant
Germany Amtlicher Handel Geregelter Markt Freiverkehr*)
(1987) (1988)
Ireland Official List Unlisted Securities Market Small Company Market
(1980) (1986)
Italy Mercato Ufficiale Mercato Ristretto Terzo Mercato
(1978)
Netherlands Official Market Official Parallel Market Inofficial Parallel Market
(1982-1993) bzw. Incourante Market
Norway B~rs I 5MB-List (vorher B~rsrr) -
(1983)
Portugal Mercado de Cota~6es Segundo Mercado Mercado sem Cota<;6es
Oficiais (1991) (1983)
Sweden A-List O-List OTC-List
(1987) (1983)
Switzerland . Hauptb6rse NebenbOrse AuBerbOrslicher Handel
(1990)
Spain 1) Mercado Continuo Madrid: Segundo Mercado -
2) Mercado de Corros Barcelona: Segundo Mer-
cado para Pymes (1986)
United Official List Unlisted Securities Market OTC- or "535.5"-market
Kingdom (1980) (Third Market 1987-1990)
(in italics = market segment abolished)
Source: Allen/Duran (1993) and various reports by the European stock exchanges
43. Special Stock Market Segments for Smaller Companies
3.1 The Unlisted Securities Market in the UK
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) opened the "Unlisted Securities Market" (USM)
on November 10th, 1980. As compared to the "Official List", the main market
segment of the LSE, admission and disclosure requirements were lowered signifi-
cantly (Table 2). That reduced the initial and continuing cost of admission in the
USM.14 Due to fiscal distictions in statute between listed and unlisted companies the
USM was initiated as a market for unlisted securities.IS
Table 2: Entry requirements
I Official List USM
IMarket capitalization £ 700,000 No minimum
I Minimum trading record 3 years (5 years until 2 years (3 years until
1Jan 1990) 1Jan 1990)
IMarketability 25 % ofequity capital 10 % ofequity capital
in public hands in public hands
Source: Abel (11)1)3), p. 18
Stock exchange members are generally restricted to trade only in shares admitted to
the market. Rule 535.2, which replaced the former rule 163.2, however, makes an
exemption by allowing members to apply for permission to trade in shares not
admitted to the Stock Exchange. For that reason an OTC- or "Rule 535.2"-market
exists, in which currently nearly 1.000 companies are quoted.
During its first decade of its existence, the USM proved to be a great success: The
number of entrants grew rapidly. Many companies whose shares were formerly
traded in the aTe-market, switched to the USM.I6 In 1984 and 1988 more than a
hundred companies were introduced. That puts the total to more than 780 companies
since the USM~s inception in 1980 (figure 1). The number of quoted companies
increased from 23 in the first year to 448 in 1989. With a total market capitalization
of almost £ 9 bn in 1989 and an annual turnover of more than 6 bn £ in 1987 the
USM reached a market share of2 % ofthe entire British stock market (figure 2).
In January 1987, the London Stock Exchange opened the "Third Market" as a second
unlisted stock market segment. It was designed as a "Venture Capital Market" for
young enterprises that could not fulfil USM admission requirements.I7 Because of
14 see Buckland/Davis (1989), p. 53-63 and Buckland (1992), p. 736.
15 see Duncan 1986. p.2.
16 see Buckland (1992), p.736.
17 see The Stock Exchange (1986).
5declining investor interest and considerable illiquidity problems this market had to be
closed at the end of 1990. About half the companies were transferred to the USM.
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Since 1990 the USM has also been threatened by serious liquidity problems: In 1992
customer turnover dropped to £ 1,273m, which is only 20 % of 1987 turnover. The
average numberoftransactions per trading day fell from 3,818 to 564. The number of
new issues also fell dramatically in 1992 as only 7 companies were admitted. The
6LSE therefore decided to close down the USM at the end of 1992, but due to
investors' and issuers' complaints postponed the final closure until 1996.18
Poor economic conditions and fading commitment of institutional investors are
regarded as important reasons for the USM's decline. 19 Because ofnumerous failures
and bankruptcies and because of the incorporaton of companies from the Third
Market the USM has lost its former identity of an "exciting growth market"20 and is
now regarded as "the inferior segment of ~K equity trading".21
The USM is associated with illiquidity problems of smaller companies which
discourages investors from investing in USM stocks. Illiquidity, however, affects all
smaller companies, regardless of whether they are listed in the Official List or quoted
in the USM. Market maker coverage of less liquid SEAQ-securities has generally
declin~d since 1986 as investors focused on the top 350 UK stocks that account for
roughly 90 % ofturnover by value.22
The principal reason for the negative development of the USM lies in the greater
accessability of the Official List for smaller companies after the amendment of the
EC Listing Particulars Directive in 1990, which lowered admission requirements to
its current level (table 2). Almost all companies seeking admission to stock exchange
trading may now be listed in the Official List. Besides, the costs ofjoining the USM
have become very similar to those of entering the Official List. In the past, the cost
advantage in the USM was a significant factor. The London Stock Exchange
therefore sees no restrictions in the access ofsmaller companies to equity capital as a
consequence ofthe USM's closure at the end of 1996.23
Nevertheless, the LSE appointed a "Smaller Companies Working Party" to look for
alternatives to the USM. Companies that do not qualify or cannot afford to join the
Official List must have access to equity capital. A recently published report by this
working party proposes the establishment of an "Enterprise Market".24 That new
market will have to be totally different from the Official List in terms of cost,
regulation and identity in order to be accepted by issuers and investors.25
In addition to that, another working party named CISCO (City Group for Smaller
Companies) was set up to analyze possible benefits and opportunities of an "Enter-
18 see Abel (1993). p. 17.
19 see Buckland (1992). p. 737.
20 see Abel (1993). p. 18.
21 see Buckland (1992). p.737.
22 see Wells (1991) and Abel (1993). p. 20.
23 see Abel (1993). p. 18-20 und London Stock Exchange (1993).
24 see London Stock Exchange (1994).
25 see Abel (1993). p. 20.
7prise Market". This group has proposed a segmentation of the British stock market
into three tiers:
I) an International Equity Market for the top 350 securities ("super league"), with
~imum market capitalization of£ 150m,
2) a National Market for the majority ofUK listed companies, and
3) an Enterprise Market for growth companies.26
The image of the new Enterprise Market will have to be actively marketed. There
should be no trading history ormarket capitalization requirements, but 25 % ofequity
capital must be offered to the public at the time of introduction. Initially, this market
should concentrate on high-tech companies in order to establish its image as an inno-
vative market. Mainly, private investors will be active as market participants. CISCO
believes that this market should be run inQependently from the London Stock
Exchange, like the NASDAQ in the US. Later, the Enterprise Market could be
expanded into a pan-European market by linking together the national stock markets
for smaller companies.27
3.2 The Second Marche in France
The "Second Marche" of the French stock exchanges was introduced on February
1st, 1983. It was designed for companies that could not apply for full listing in the
"Cote Officielle", the main market segment, but were expected to attract sufficient
investor interest and liquidity. Only a minimum of 10 % of equity capital has to be
floated. Disclosure requirements were also loosened. Below those two markets there
is an OTC-market ("Marche Hors Cote"), which had been in existence since 1962.
Without any listing requirements - a company~s shares could actually be traded
against the management~s will - this market did and does not provide any kind of
investor protection.
Admission to the Second Marche is granted by the French stock market supervisory
authority COB (Commission des Operations de Bourse) for a preliminary period of
three years. Admission will only be prolonged if the company fulfils the following
conditions:
- 10 % ofshare capital must be in public hands;
- there must be at least 40 quotations on the stock exchange every quarter and at least
one every week with effective turnover;
- the COB~s disclosure requirements have to be fulfilled by the company.
As a consequence, many companies have signed contracts with a bank or a broker
("contrat de liquidite") to ensure an orderly quotation as required by the COB.28
26 see CISCO (1994), p. 8.
27 see Cohen (1994).
28 see Jaffeux (1992), p. 24.
8The French Second Marche also proved to be a great success, at least at the begin-
ning: With a high number of new issues - 70 companies went public in 19R7, raising
more than FF 7 bn - the total number of listed companies amounted to almost 300 in
19R9 (table 3 and figure 3). Thus, in terms ofquoted companies, the Second Marche
became the second most important stock market segment after the British USM.
Table 3: New issues in the Second Marche, 1983-1990
Year Number of Combined Average Combined market Average
companies proceeds proceeds per value ofissued market value
issued issue companies
(FFm) (FFm) (FFm) (FFm)
\'.183 18 402.0 22.3 4,052.6 225
1984 29 867.1 29.9 7,829.5 270
1985 55 3,218.4 58.5 26,815.6 488
1986 5\ 2,661.5 52.2 24,552.4 481
1987 70 7,127.2 101.8 53,679.8 767
1'.188 26 1,093.3 42.1 13,777.9 530
I'.IX9 30 1,861.8 62.1 17,734.9 591
1'.190 13 935.4 71.9 10,583.1 814
Total 292 18,166.7 62.2 159,025.6 544
Source: COB (19'.12), p. 16
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Market capitalization and turnover volume reflected the growing importance of the
Second Marche: In 19R7 the Second Marche reached a market share of more than
910 % of the entire French stock market (figure 4). Especially the regional stock
exchanges in Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Nancy und Nantes have profited to a
great extent: In 1987, more than 40 % of the total trading volume or the regional
stock exchanges was done in companies listed in the Second Marche.20
Since the stock market crash of October 1987 the Second Marche has been on a
downward slope: In 1992, only 4 companies went public. At the same time, 20
companies were excluded from the Second Marche, most of them after take-over
bids.30 Annual turnover fell by more than 70 % to FF 18.9 bn, compared to FF 64.4
bn in 1987. In the first half of 1993, the Second Marche accounted for only 2,5 % of
total stock exchange turnover. That is less, measured in relative terms, than in the
Second Marche/s first year ofexistence in 1983 (figure 4).
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As a consequence the French stock exchange authority SBF (Societe des Bourses
Franl;aises) and the COB set up a working committee to investigate the situation and
its causes. A report proposing reform measures was published in February 1993.31
Since 1991, the Second Marche has been going through a deep crisis: The number of
introductions has not been sufficient to ensure a constant renewal of the Cote Offi-
cielle, where the number of listed stocks is still declining. In June 1993, only 497
companies were listed - a drop of 130 companies compared to 1987. Besides, the
strict distinction between the two lower market segments of the French stock market
has vanished. Due to relatively high listing costs, many companies preferred to enter
29 see Jaffeux (1992), p. 57 und COB (1992), p. 9.
30 see SBF-Bourse de Paris (1993a), p. 23 und 25.
31 see COB/SBF (1993).
10the Marche Hors Cote rather than the Second Marche which requires an extensive
listing procedure.32 Additionally, the Second Marche has suffered to a great extent
from a continuing concentration of stock exchange turnover favouring blue chip
stocks. As in the UK, this is not a specific problem of the Second Marche, but of all
smaller companies in general.33
In summary, the Second Marche declined as many companies lost their interest in
going public, while fmancial intermediaries turned to the Cote Officielle instead,
which generates more profitable business, and investors, disappointed by the
market's slack performance in the past, withdrew from the market altogehter.34 The
Second Marche also lost its former image as an innovative market for companies
with strong growth potential.
In order to make the Second Marche more attractive for investors and issuers, a
numoer of recommendations were submitted by the working committee: Companies,
that are currently quoted in the OTC-market but would fulfil listing requirements, are
to be animated to enter the Second Marche. A stricter separation between those two
stock market segments will help to emphasize the Second Marche's own identity.
Therefore, trading mechanisms in both markets have been altered already: While two
daily batch auctions and in some cases even continuous trading apply for companies
listed in the Second Marche, only a single price a day will be determined for securi-
ties quoted in the Marche Hors Cote)5
Other approaches focus on improving information transparency as well as market
liquidity. By signing special contracts with the issuing companies ("contrat d'anima-
tion"), financial intermediaries like banks or broker companies commit themselves to
quote bid-ask spreads for a minumum number of shares and thus maintain an orderly
and liquid market. Additionally, the total cost of maintaining a listing in the Second
Marche - around FF 7RO,OOO armually - is to be cut by lowering some transparency
and communication requirements and by adapting them to the number of share
holders)6 By supporting investment clubs specialized in small company and by
organizing roadshows, the Paris stock exchange hopes to encourage private and insti-
tutional investors to return to the Second Marche.
32 see COB/SBF(1993). p. 8.
33 see COB/SBF(1993), p. 4.
34 see COB/SBF (1993), p. 14.
35 see SBF-Bourse de Paris (1993c).
36 see COB/SBF (1993). p. 7-19 and 22.
113.3 The Official Parallel Market in the Netherlands
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange introduced its "Parallel Market" on January 28,
1982. Before that date, there were only two stock market segments: the "Official
Market" for listed companies and the unregulated "Incourante Market" for unlisted
companies, in which a number of "incourante fondsen" (occasionally quoted
domestic securities) traded off-exchange. This market was organized by two broker
firms that quoted bid and ask prices.37
The Parallel Market was subdivided into two segments. In order to be admitted to the
upper segment a company's effective value had to be at least Dft 2.5m, of which 10
% had to be issued to the public.38 The prospectus must contain the company's
balance sheet as well as the profit and loss accounts of the last three years.39 As the
EC Listing Particulars Directive was incorporated into the Dutch stock exchange law
in 1990, minimum capitalization in the upper segment of the Parallel Market was
raised to Dft 5m. At the same time, the market was renamed "Official Parallel Mar-
ket" (OPM) to underline its status as an official market segment. In the lower seg-
ment of the Parallel Market, which is still called "Incourante Markt', oder "Unlisted
Market", no formal admission requirements exist.4o
The Official Parallel Market expanded continuously during the first years. At the end
of 1992, a total 68 domestic companies were listed there, market capitalization stood
at Dft 2.5bn. Annual turnover developed similarly but already reached its absolute
peak (Dft 5.2bn) in 1986 (figure 5). Since then the annual turnover in the OPM
followed a downward trend: In 1992, effective turnover value dropped to Dft 890m.
The new issues market dried up completely. Most new companies moved up from the
Unlisted Market.
Both cyclical and fundamental factors have contributed to this development. Most
investors trading actively in the OPM were private investors.41 Low interest rates
boosted interest for these shares. As interest rates started to rise at the beginning of
the 1990's investors returned to bonds. In addition small and medium size companies
were hit harder by recession than big stocks. Some OPM-companies even went
bankrupt.
The Dutch fiscal law exempts investors from tax on future dividends if they hold five
percent ormore ofa company's share capital. As companies in the OPM tended to be
37 see Schmidt et al. (1984), p. 159.
38 see Schmidt etal. (1984), p. 164.
391n the Official Market a minimum market capitalization ofDft 50m with an entry requirement of 100 % applied,
but only 5 % of total share capital had to be in public hands. In the listing prospectus the company's balance
sheets ofthe last five years were required, see ABN Amro (1992), p. 6.
40 see ABN Amro (1992), p. 6.
41 see Amsterdam Stock Exchange (1990), p. 3.
12smaller than those in the Official Market, 5 %-holdings in OPM-stocks could be built
up more easily in these stocks. These investments are popular among tax-paying
institutional investors. This fiscal provision increases interest in smaller companies on
the one hand, but on the other hand reduces turnover activity because these holdings
tend to be withdrawn from the stock market for a long-term period.42
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Many of the more successful companies, that gave the market some kind of glamour,
switched over to the Official Market. This wouldn't have been an issue of concern
with an active primary market replacing the gaps. As the primary market dried up,
.however, the OPM as a whole became more and more illiquid. Instead, closed-end
investment funds applied for listing in the OPM. At the end of 1992, almost halfofall
OPM-securities were investment fund shares that generally generated low turnover.
This dilution also damaged the OPM's former image as an innovative market.
Even though a reform programme had been proposed, that envisioned the quotation
of investment funds in a separate list, intensified investor relation activities as well as
the provision of more and accurate company data, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange
closed the OPM at the end of 1993. All securities were transferred to the Official
Market, where minimum capitalization requirement was lowered from Dfl 50 m to
Dfl 25m to allow access for smaller companies.
42 see ABN Amm (1992). p. 10.
133.4 The Mercato Ristretto in Italy
Today ten regional stock exchanges exist in Italy. Like other European countries, the
equity market is divided into three segments: The official market segment is the
"Mercato Ufficiale", in which most companies are listed. Since its legal revitalization
in 1978, the stock exchanges in Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Rome und Turin
have established the "Mercato Ristretto" as their second stock market segment.
Security tramactions in both segments may either be effected on-the-exchange or off-
exchange. Moreover, there is an unregulated OTC-market ("Terzo Mercato" or Third
Market) for unlisted securities, left completely unsupervised by the stock exchange
authority CONSOB. In Milan, about 30 companies are currently quoted in the Terzo
Mercato by telephone.
In order to be admitted to the Mercato Ristretto a company's share capital must
exceed Lit Ibn. IO% of total share capital must be issued to the public.43 Of the six
regional Mercati Ristretti in Italy only the one in Milan is of greater importance:
Those 37 companies listed in Milan generated an annual turnover of Lit 511 bn in
1992, which accounted for roughly 95 % of the total trading volume of all Mercati
Ristretti cornbined.44 (figure 6).
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Turnover in the Mercato Ristretto has always been very low: The annual turnover
ratio (annual turnover divided by market capitalization) usually lies between 2 % and
4 %. Although a large proportion of turnover is effected off-the-exchange and block
43 see Consiglio di Borsa (1993), p. 18.
44 see Comitato del MerCalo Ristrello di Milano (1993). p. 28.
14trading facilities exist45, the Mercato Ristretto must be described as an extremely
illiquid market.
Figure 7: The Mercato Ristretto in Milan
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As opposed to other junior markets, the Mercato Ristretto has never been a market
for young and innovative enterprises.46 Most companies are cooperative or savings
banks whose shares cannot be traded in the Mercato Ufficiale because of restricted
share transferability. Duncan therefore speaks of a bank "monoculture" in the Mer-
cato Ristretto.47 As there are plans to establish full transferability by introducing
maximum voting rights, a transfer of these shares to the main market will become
possible. Because cooperative and savings bank account for more than 90 % of the
total market capitalization and turnover, a closure of the Mercato ristretto seems
inevitable.4~ Currently, reforms of the Italian stock market for smaller companies are
considered. One proposal calls for the creation of a new stock market with designa-
ted market markers similar to NASDAQ, operated independently from the existing
stock exchanges.
45 see ComiL'lto del Mercato Ristretto di Milano (1993). p. 32-36.
46 see Duncan (1986). p. 5 und 15.
47 see Duncan (1986). p. 5.
48 see ComiL'lto del Mercato Ristretto di Milano (1993). p. 28.
153.5 The Geregelter Markt in Germany
The "Regulated Market" (Geregelter Markt) in Gennany was introduced in May
1987. It replaced the fonner "Regulated OTC-Market" (Geregelter Freiverkehr). As
there are eight regional stock exchanges in Gennany, eight such market segments
exist. Unlike the Official Market ("Amtlicher Handel"), admission requirements for
the Regulated Market are not detennined by the Gennan Stock Exchange Law but by
the rules and regulation ofthe regional stock exchanges (table 4). Thus, they differ to
a certain degree, which on the other hand allows for greater flexibility. Admission
costs for the Regulated Market are only about half the costs of entering the Official
Market. When a company later transfers to the main market, initial Regulated Market
admission costs are counted. There are also eight regional OTC-markets (Freiver-
kehr). Although trading in OTC-stocks takes place on the floor of the offical stock
exchanges, private and commercial law applies. This market is designed primarily as
a market place for trading and only to a lesser degree as a source of finance for the
issuing company. Unlike other European OTC-markets, the Gennan Freiverkehr is
regulated by an association ofsecurities traders.
Table 4: Listing requirements
Amtlicher Handel Geregelter Markt
(Official Trading) (Regulated Market)
Admission procedure German Stock Exchange Law rules and regulation of the German
regulated by (Borsengesetz) and Stock Exchange regional stock exchanges
Admission Ordinance (Borsenordnung)
(Borsenzulassungsverordnung)
Application for listing fIled by the issuing company and at ftled by the issuing company and a
least one bank that has to be a bank or a suitable non-bank.
member ofthe stock exchange
Listing prospectus full prospectus company report
Minimum trading 3 years no requirements
record
Minimum DM 2.5m (market value) DM O.5m (nominal share value)
capitalization
Minimumcapital to be 25 % ofshare capital admitted to no requirements
sold to the public official listing
Continuing disclosure mandatory interim report voluntary interim report
requirements
At the end of 1993, a total of 143 companies with a capitalization of DM 20.l46bn
were listed in the Regulated Market (figure 8).49 Hence, one fifth ofall Gennan com-
panies traded on the stock exchange are listed in the second segment. However, only
49 This figure comprises only those companies whose shares are not listed in the Official Market elsewhere.
16about 2.5 % of the Gennan total stock market capitalization is accounted for by the
Regulated Market. This compares to less than half the market value of the Deutsche
Bank. Three companies (Victoria Insurance, Hapag Lloyd and Miirz), each with a
market value exceeding OM Ibn, make up more than 25 % of the market's total
capitalization. About half of all companies currently listed in the Regulated Market
were fonnerly 4uoted in the Regulated OTC-market, because they could opt for a
transfer to the new market without undergoing admission procedure again.
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The Regulated Market was accepted quite well by issuing companies: Since 1987, a
total of 71 companies with proceeds of OM 3.756bn have entered the Regulated
Market. Twelve companies have later been transferred to the Official Market. In the
official market, only 43 companies, but with total proceeds of OM 9.l54bn, were
issued (figure 9). Therefore, the Regulated Market has provided an adequate stock
market setting for companies intending to go public. Since 1989, however, the
number of new issues has fallen continuously. In 1993, only three new companies
entered the Regulated Mar~et while only four companies listed their shares in the
Official Market. Compared internationally, the Gennan IPO-market is still under-
developed, both in tenns ofnumber ofintroductions as well as proceeds.
Today, quite a few Regulated Market stocks suffer from illiquidity. On an average
trading day, about half the stocks do not trade at all or order imbalances occur. In
1993, annual turnover value of in domestic stocks listed in the Regulated Market
amounted to OM 15,9bn, which equals about 0,86 % ofthe total share turnover ofall
Gennan stock exchanges. This figure compares to 1,06 % for 1991 (source: Deut'iche
Borse AG). The Regulated Market's illiquidity, which also affects companies listed
17in the Amtlicher Handel and traded once a day at the noon auction (Kassahandel),
may be partly explained by the companies' low free float. As many large companies
tend to be dominated by major shareholders, in some cases more than 90 % ofequity
capital are closely held, the average free float in the Regulated Market, weighted by
market value, only amounts to OM S,Rbn or 26,4 % of the market capitalization
(figure 10). The free float of the entire German stock market, including standard
stocks, is much higher, around 54 %.
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Figure 10: Free Float ofCompanies listed in the Regulated Market. IYXX-1993
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18Unlike the French stock market, a company may be cross-listed on each of the eight
regional stock exchanges in Germany. Therefore, almost half of all companies listed
in the Regulated Market are traded on two or more regional stock exchanges. Both
trading methods (noon auction or continuous trading) and the assignment to one of
the three stock market segments are handled differently by each stock exchange. A
security issue may be be traded continuously in the Regulated Market in Stuttgart
while being quoted once a day in the aTe-market of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
The most prominent examples are BMW, Dt. Babcock, Kaufhof or PWA whose
shares are listed or quoted in all three stock market segments. Insufficient regional
standardization as well as the incorporation of many former aTe-stocks have pre-
vented the Regulated Market from developing its own image as an innovative market.
It is not regarded as a market segment of its own and is sometimes even called an
"amputated" or "mutilated" market. Possible approaches for a reform of the Regu-
lated Market in the future will have to focus on creating a distinct image by harmo-
nizing admission and trading procedures across all German stock exchanges.
3.6 Other European Junior Stock Markets
Other European junior stock markets for smaller companies tell a similar story. The
Oslo stock exchange for example introduced its second market segment ("Bl?lrsII") in
19R3 and renamed it "SMB-List" in 1992. Two stocks, out ofa total of 18, accounted
for more than 90 % of the total turnover in 1992. The others were largely illiquid
with annual turnover ratios between 0 % and 9,6 %.50 Market capitalization as well
as the number oflisted shares have been declining for some time (figure I I).
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50seeOsioBI/lrs (1993). p. 16-19.
19While some of the new stock market segments were successful at least during the
first years, others never left the experimental stage. The Belgian "Second Marche" or
"Tweede Markt", introduced in January 1985, only consisted of seven domestic
companies at the end of 1992.51
The Spanish "Segundo Mercado" and the "Segundo Mercado para PYMES",
established in 1986 by the stock exchanges in Madrid and Barcelona respectively,
were not very successful either: At the end of 1992, only two companies were listed
in Madrid whereas 21 were listed in Barcelona. Accordingly, both stock market
capitalization and turnover are quite low.52
The Portuguese stock exchanges in Lisbon and Oporto established the "Segundo
Mercado" in the course ofthe reform programme in 1991. It is therefore too early to
draw a fmal conclusion about success orfailure ofthis stock market segment.
4. Causesfor the Decline ofthe European Junior Stock Markets
The European stock exchanges all made similar experiences with their second stock
market segments: At first, the high expectations, fostered at the time of their intro-
duction in the early 1980's, were largely fulfilled as the high numbers of new issues
generated significant turnover and trading activity and led to a renewal ofthe national
stock markets. By the end of the 1980's, however, the trend reversed. The new
issues-market dried up and the stock market segments for smaller companies became
increasingly illiquid.
The European junior stock markets for smaller companies have been facing liquidity
problems since 1987. Sometimes the stock market crash of 1987 is regarded as the
cause for the negative trend but several other factors have contributed to the problem
as well.53 Some of them are of cyclical, others of fundamental nature. For instance,
there are flaws in the design of these markets, especially the insufficient differentia-
tion between the upper and the lower stock market segment. In case of the Nether-
lands, fiscal factors have added to the problem. The main reason, however, seems to
be the changing character ofthe European capital markets dominated by institutional
and international investors.
There is no doubt that positive economic conditions in the 1980's favoured growth in
the international capital markets in general and the development of junior stock
market segments in specific. Low interest rates and positive economic conditions
made stocks an attractive investment alternative. High valuation levels of equity
51 see Jaffeux (1992), p. 175.
52 see FIBV (1993), p. 46-49.
53 see Buckland (1992), p. 737.
20capital made it profitable for companies to go public.54 It is therefore argued, that the
uprise in the new issues market would have taken place anyway, even without the
creation ofthe new junior stock market.55
As interest rates started to rise again at the end of the past decade, many investors
returned to bonds. Additionally, smaller companies generally suffered more severely
from recession than blue chip stocks. Especially the primary markets were hit as the
number of introduction fell dramatically. Even though a revival in the new issue
markets throughout Europe may be expected as soon as economic conditions
improve, the high degree ofdependence on economic conditions poses a fundamental
flaw ofthese stock market segments: Recession has hit these market segments harder
than the main market. As a consequence, they have dried out severely. The expected
uprise in IPO-activities, therefore, will not affect the second markets but will take
place only in the main stock market segments. In the U.S. on the other hand, turnover
activ-ity and IPOs in the NASDAQ-market were never affected to such an extent,
although the American economy went through a deep recession. Only ifthe segments
are viable through the entire economic cycle, there will be a chance of a lasting
existence.
Another difficulty stems from their status as transitory markets. They were designed
to facilitate access to the stock market for those companies unable or reluctant to list
their shares in the main market. In the course of time, however, the more successful
companies were to be prepared for a transfer. Thus, only the less attractive issues re-
mained in the second segment. This fact alone does not necessarily lead to an adverse
selection problem as long as an active primary market provides enough supplies of
new companies. With the new issues market dried-up completely, however, the
second market segments were deprived of their "off-spring" which damaged their
image as innovative markets for companies with high growth potential. It is interes-
ting to note that in the US, many successful and now blue chip-companies, who
started their "stock market career" in NASDAQ, still remain there, although they
could easily fulfil all NYSE listing requirements. The most prominent examples are
Intel, Microsoft, Apple or Novell. The NASDAQ-stock market as a whole profits
from these companies' image as high-performing stocks.
Insufficient differentiation between stock market segments, both against the main
market as well as against the OTC-market, poses another problem. After the amend-
ment of the EC Listing Particulars Directive in 1990, British companies could access
the Official Market more easily. As the USM's admission cost advantage vanished,
most new companies prefered to list their shares in the main market. The Second
Marche in France also ran into difficulties as many companies chose to enter the
OTe-market, which in their opinion provided an equal setting for stock exchange
54 see Jaffeux (1992), p. 175.
55see Buck.I<Uld (1992), p. 736.
21trading. The Gennan Regulated Market is also affected negatively as the assignment
to the market segments differs across regional stock exchanges. Thus, these junior
stock markets either lost or were inhibited from developing an image as independent
and innovative markets for companies with high growth potential.
The main reason for the decline of the European second stock market segments is a
more fundamental one. It does not only affect the stocks listed in those segments, but
basically all second-line stocks in general, whether listed in the first or second seg-
ment: The general setting on the European capital markets has changed dramatically
during the last few years. Deregulation, securitisation, automation, internationalisa-
tion, globalisation, institutionalisation of the capital markets as well as the
appearance of new financial products and competition between European financial
centres have been discussed extensively in finance literature. As a consequence,
domestic and cross-border security transactions have multiplied. Although growing
institutionalisation has had a positive effect on stock market liquidity, not all stocks
have benefitted equally.56 With institutional and international investors dominating
today's equity markets57, asset allocation has increasingly replaced stock picking as
investment strategy. This led to a concentration of stock exchange turnover in favour
of standard stocks, because institutional and international investors generally prefer
larger companies.
Private investors, who in the past used to invest parts of their wealth in smaller com-
panies, are increasingly advised to buy investment fund certificates. Many of those
private investors, that still do manage their own investments, prefer to buy covered
warrants on interest rates, foreign currencies, stock indices etc. rather than smaJl
company stocks. Especially the Gennan market for warrants has grown impressively
during the last few years. At the end of 1993, almost 2.200 different warrants were
traded.58 -'
Growing popularity of passive investment strategies among institutionals has added
to the concentration of turnover acivity.59 By duplicating stock indices, passively
managed investment funds try to eliminate all unsystematic or company-specific risk
components. Depending on the stock index, that is used as a benchmark, investments
may be limited to the most liquid blue chips only. Second-line stocks, on the other
hand, may be neglected.60 Many internationally-oriented investment funds, therefore,
restrict their holdings to approximately 20 to 50 standard stocks in each country,
56ln theV.S. stock market. Jones/Lelm/Mulherin (1991) found adecrease in relative bid-ask spreads (and con-
cluded that market liquidity increased) for stocks with high institutional ownership between 1982 and 1988.
while the opposite is true for stocks with low institutional ownership.
57 The Deutsche Borse AG estimates that domestic and international institutionals account for 80 % of total
turnover in German stocks. see Deutsche Borse AG (1993). p.7.
58 see Deutsche Borse AG (1994). Jahresbericht 1993. p. 133.
59 see Deutsche Borse AG (1994). Jahresbericht 1993. p. 78.
60 see HoweU/Cozzini (1991). p. 47.
22depending on the size of the equity market.61 As a consequence, many banks and
investment companies restrict their research and trading activities to these stocks.
Since the cost of information collecting and processing cannot be covered by earning
commissions, most smaller companies are researched only sporadically or are even
totally neglected. This further reduces turnover and hence the attractiveness of these
companies.
This development leads shares of small and medium-sized companies into a twofold
"vicious circle" of illquidity (figure 12): On the one hand, investors incur high trans-
action costs when they trade illiquid stocks, especially when large positions are to be
traded. High transaction costs impede that holdings are traded often.62 Few, if any,
investors would buy illiquid stocks for short-term liquidity considerations. Only long-
term buy-and-hold-strategies, that further reduce market liquidity, promise to be
profitable.63 Many market participants, banks, and investors, will eventually with-
draw from trading in these stocks altogether.64
Figure 12: The "Vicious Circle" of Uliquidity
The "Vicious Circle"of Illiquidity
1__ ~lnsufficientprocessing of
company information






61 In the UK. this number is larger as basically all 350 stocks conurined in theFf 350-index are actively traded and
researched.
62 see Wells (1992), p. 19.
63 see Stoll (1984). p. 197-198.
64 see Pagano (1989).
23On the other hand, a second vicious circle affects the flow of company information:
Low turnover makes it unprofitable for investment banks and brokers to research
smaller companies, because the costs associated with collecting and processing
company information cannot be covered by brokerage commissions. This fact is a
direct consequence of the information paradoxon described by Grossman/Stieglitz
(1980). Ifinformation is costly, an equilibrium evolves in which the cost of informa-
tion will equal the marginal benefit of that additional piece of information. The addi-
tional benefit, however, depends on the stock/s liquidity: The higher the volume that
can be traded without influencing the market price, the higher the potential return on
research activities. The extent to which company information is collected and
processed, and therefore the degree of informational efficiency, depends directly on
the marketability and liquidity of a company/s shares.65 Thus, even the twentieth or
fiftieth research study of a standard stock may be profitable whereas not even the
first study ofmany smallercompanies will cover its costs.
This will eventually lead to a two-tier stock market: On the one hand, the majority of
market participants focuses on internationally known standard stocks with high mar-
ket capitalization and a high stock exchange turnover. They belong to a "thundering
thousand superleague ofglobal stocks".66 Proposed and initiated stock exchange pro-
jects on the European level, e.g. "Eurolist" , the creation of a "European Wholesale
Market" for institutional investors or private computerized trading systems for cross-
country security business, are only logical consequences. On the other hand, second-
line stocks will lose their importance and attractiveness to investors as they become
increasingly illiquid. This limits those companies/ sources of equity fmance: While
passively managed funds automatically participate in secondary offerings of stocks
contained in their benchmark index, small companies will increasingly run into
problems when they issue new shares.67 In orderto attract investors, these companies
have to offer a higher expected return than blue chips. This, however, raises their
cost of equity and puts them at a disadvantage against large companies in terms of
competitiveness.68
65see also Groth/Martin (1981).
66 see HoweU/Cozzini 1991, p. 47.
67 see HoweU/Cozzini (1991), p. 47.
68 see Stoll (1984), p. 198 and Gerke (1993), p. 620-621.
245. Conclusion and Outlook
Until today, the European capital markets do not provide an adequate secondary mar-
ket for young and innovative companies comparable to NASDAQ. The importance of
stock markets for smaller companies has generelly declined as the European capital
markets became increasingly globalized and institutionalised. Growing institutio-
nalisation, however, does not necessarily lead to a total neglect of less liquid small-
cap stocks. On the contrary, the NASDAQ stock market in the US for instance is
dominated by institutional investors and yet, it is a very active and liquid market for
smaller companies.69 This may be explained by the structure of the U.S. investment
industry: At the end of 1993, more than 4.500 mutual funds were registered under
SEC-regulation. Many of these funds have total assets less than US$ 10m. They
research and invest primarily in small high-tech companies with high growth and risk
potential and may therefore be regarded as "venture-capital"-funds. This type of
inves-tment fund is generally not offered to European private investors, because
national regulation generally limits a mutual fund~s investments to listed shares only.
A change ofinvestment regulation in Europe should therefore be considered.
The creation of new markets for smaller companies, which are operated indepen-
dently from the existing stock exchanges, as currently proposed in the UK and Italy,
might be a step towards the right direction. It must be kept in mind, though, that new
stock markets will only be able to exist ifthey are accepted by investors, issuers and
intermediaries alike. These markets could also provide an exit mechanism for venture
capitalists. As the reorganisation of the German stock market continues, a solution
for the fmancial needs of smaller companies must be found. It should be further
investigated in how far the existing regional stock markets could play an active role
in this issue. Because all European stock markets are equally affected, a pan-Euro-
pean solution should also be taken into consideration.
69 It must be noted. however, that a large proportion of total turnover is done in large-cap stocks that remained in
NASDAQ. see NASD (1993), p. 33.
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